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Credit Growth and Response
to Capital Requirements
Evidence from Indian Public Sector Banks
This paper makes an attempt to assess the impact of imposition of uniform capital
requirement norm on flow of credit to the business sector by the most important segment of
the Indian banking sector, i e, Indian public sector banks. A simple decomposition analysis
of growth in assets portfolio as well as a model based analysis of credit growth for the
Indian public sector banks corroborated that (a) in the post reform period, public sector
banks did shift their portfolio in a way that reduce their capital requirements
and (b) adoption of stricter risk management practice in respect of bank lending in the post
reform period and its interplay with minimum capital requirements (regulatory pressure)
have had a dampening effect on the overall credit supply.
weighted assets to low risk assets and/or
(b) banks might reduce its total assets, for
a given capital base, to meet the standards.
In either case, the net outcome is that of
a reduced credit flow to the business sector.
In fact, risk-based capital may be regarded
as a regulatory tax that is higher on risky
assets. Since it is more costly to raise
capital as compared to insured deposits,
the banks would have an incentive for
substituting out of assets with 100 per cent
risk weights like commercial loan into
assets with 0 per cent risk weight like
government securities. For an emerging
economy like India, uncritical adoption of
such international standards may com-
pound the problem of resource flow to the
business sector in the absence of a well-
developed capital market. In this paper, we
have attempted to find empirical evidence
for the alleged credit crunch that might
have been aggravated by the application
of capital standards. We have confined our
analysis to the Indian public sector banks
only, primarily for reason of data availabi-
lity. As the public sector banks account for
more than 75 per cent of total credit flow
to the commercial sector, we believe our
results have general validity for the Indian
banking sector.
The paper is organised as follows: the
prescription of capital standards under
Basle accord (1988) and their imposition
on Indian banks has been discussed in
Section II. This section also includes a
brief review of some recent studies on
capital standard and bank behaviour. As
credit growth is envisaged to be inter-
twined with industrial growth, a brief
account of industrial performance in the
recent period is also illustrated to provide
a backdrop for the main objective of the
study. Section III presents briefly the re-
cent trends, especially after liberalisation
of financial sector in 1992, in major com-
ponent, of asset portfolio and capital ratio.
Portfolio shifts and the impact of capital
ratio on portfolio compositions are dis-
cussed analytically in this section. The
relationship between capital standard
norms and bank’s lending behaviour is
examined in Section IV with the help of
an econometric model. Section V con-
cludes with the major findings.
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Basle  Accord Basle  Accord Basle  Accord Basle  Accord Basle  Accord
on  Capital  Standards on  Capital  Standards on  Capital  Standards on  Capital  Standards on  Capital  Standards
The widespread criticism about declin-
ing capital standards of banks and the
consequent bank failures led the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) to announce the adoption of risk-
based capital standards. The 1988 Basle
Accord requires banks to maintain ade-
quate capital in the form of equity and
quasi-equity in a prescribed proportion to
their risk weighted asset base. The primary
purpose of these standards is to make capital
requirements of banks responsive to the
risks in the asset portfolio of banks. Prior
to adoption of this accord, banks in the
G-10 countries were required to keep a
certain percentage of their total assets as
capital (called leverage requirement),
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Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
T
he regulatory framework for the
Indian banking sector underwent a
major paradigm shift since the onset
of reform process for the Indian economy
in 1991. One important component of this
new regulatory framework has been the
introduction of prudential norms and capi-
tal adequacy standards on international
lines. It is now well recognised that intro-
duction of capital standards has signifi-
cantly impacted banking firm's balance
sheet and risk taking behaviour.
Recognising this the Basle Committee
formed a working party to look into the
empirical evidence for this impact for
banking firms in G-10 countries (BCBS,
1999). Their observation in this regard is
worth noting:
The overall message from the empirical
literature and the data is that, at least
initially, the introduction of formal mini-
mum capital requirements across the G-10
appears to have induced relatively weakly
capitalised institutions to maintain higher
capital ratios. At the same time, however,
there is some evidence that bank capital
pressures during recent cyclical downturns
in the US and Japan may have limited bank
lending in those periods and contributed
to economic weakness in some macroeco-
nomic sectors.
The possibility of a credit crunch through
application of minimum capital standards
arises because (a) differential risk weights
for different asset categories might induce
banks to switch away from high risk
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without any consideration for different risk
profile of various categories of assets. The
committee on financial sector reforms
(Narasimham Committee) recommended
introduction of capital adequacy standard
for the banks in India on similar lines.
Based on these recommendations, RBI
introduced a capital to risk-weighted asset
system for banks in India since April 1992.
According to RBI stipulations, banks were
to attain an 8 per cent capital to risk assets
ratio (CRAR) within a specified time
frame.1 The time to attain the prescribed
ratio was made more stringent for Indian
banks with international exposure. In spite
of facing some initial problem in meeting
the CRAR norms, the Indian public sector
banks could, by and large, attain the pre-
scribed CRAR of 8 per cent, with 26 banks
having met the norm by 1999.
Capital  Standards  and  Banks’ Capital  Standards  and  Banks’ Capital  Standards  and  Banks’ Capital  Standards  and  Banks’ Capital  Standards  and  Banks’
Behaviour  –  Review Behaviour  –  Review Behaviour  –  Review Behaviour  –  Review Behaviour  –  Review
of  Literature of  Literature of  Literature of  Literature of  Literature
The impact of introduction of risk-based
capital standards has most extensively been
studied in respect of US banks. Availabi-
lity of detailed data for US banks, which
are large in number, has helped researchers
to undertake such studies. One stylised
fact that has been cited by many research-
ers that a significant shift in the compo-
sition of asset portfolio of US banks has
taken place since 1989. The shift was
towards holding of government securities
and away from bank lending. Haubrich
and Wachtel (1993) have analysed the
quarterly ‘call report’ data of US commer-
cial banks and concluded that changes
in portfolio composition are strongly re-
lated to the introduction of risk-based
capital requirements. Since banks would
be naturally inclined to alter their portfolio
structure towards safer assets during an
economic downturn, Hall (1993) argued
that observed structural changes in banks’
asset portfolio could not be fully accounted
by the cyclical factors and regulatory changes
did impact banks’ portfolio behaviour.
Berger and Udell (1994) distinguished
two different sets of determinants, repre-
senting ‘supply side’ and ‘demand side’
factors, respectively, for explaining credit
growth. Risk-based capital is included as
a supply side determinant of credit growth.
They compared the banks’ behaviour of
1990-92 to the behaviour of 1980s to
account for cyclical factors. They found
little evidence of supply side factors in
general and risk-based capital in particu-
lar, becoming stronger in effect since
introduction of capital standards. In a vector
auto regression model framework,
Hancock, Laing and Wilcox (1995) esti-
mated the dynamic response to capital
shocks. They concluded that banks adjust
capital ratios much faster than they adjust
their loan portfolios. Wall and Peterson
(1995) suggested that regulation had a
more important impact on bank capital
decisions than did market discipline, while
Peek and Rosengren (1995) corroborated
that formal regulatory action had a signifi-
cant impact on bank lending decisions, even
after controlling for bank capital ratios.
Ediz et al (1998) have studied the impact
of capital requirements on UK banks’
behaviour. Using a panel data for 94 UK
banks stretching from fourth-quarter 1989
to fourth-quarter 1995, they observed that
capital requirements did seem to have af-
fected bank behaviour but UK banks adju-
sted their capital ratios mostly by raising
capital rather than systematically substitut-
ing away from risky assets like corporate
loans. In a recent article, Furfine (2000),
using panel data on large US commercial
banks during 1989 to 1997, concluded that
changes in capital regulation are a necessary
ingredient to explain the decline in loan growth.
 In the context of Indian banks, Nachane
et al (2000) have studied the impact on
capital changes of regulatory pressures,
conditioning on a host of other variables
that are expected to influence capital
holding of banks. On the basis of their
empirical analysis they concluded that
regulatory prescriptions did influence
Indian banks’ capital ratio choices and
they did not observe any significant shift
from high-risk towards low-risk asset
category by banks.
Brief  Overview Brief  Overview Brief  Overview Brief  Overview Brief  Overview
of  Industrial  Performance of  Industrial  Performance of  Industrial  Performance of  Industrial  Performance of  Industrial  Performance
One of the major goals of any reform
process is to put the economy on a higher
growth trajectory on a sustained basis with
moderate to low inflation. Although the
Indian reform process has not led to any
significant increase in average growth rate
of GDP during the decade following the
beginning of the reform process, it has also
not brought about a precipitate fall in the
growth rate as compared to the decade of
1980s. As regards containment of infla-
tion, the reform process has achieved signi-
ficant success. Despite the fact that there
has not been any significant fall in the
overall growth rate, the same cannot be
said about the performance of the indus-
trial sector, more so about the organised
segment of it. The Index of Industrial
Production (IIP), which mainly reflects the
performance of, organised industrial
sector due to its nature of coverage, posted
impressive growth rates in the first four
years after 1991-92 when it registered a
negative growth rate. But since 1995-96,
Table  1:  Trends  in  Various  Balance  Sheet  Compositions, Table  1:  Trends  in  Various  Balance  Sheet  Compositions, Table  1:  Trends  in  Various  Balance  Sheet  Compositions, Table  1:  Trends  in  Various  Balance  Sheet  Compositions, Table  1:  Trends  in  Various  Balance  Sheet  Compositions,
          by  Size  Class  –  1992  to  2000 by  Size  Class  –  1992  to  2000 by  Size  Class  –  1992  to  2000 by  Size  Class  –  1992  to  2000 by  Size  Class  –  1992  to  2000
  (Per  cent)
Variables Size  Class
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Year  =  1992
Deposits/assets 82.31 84.16 85.37 85.95 63.31 82.31
Credit/assets 45.25 53.23 45.97 51.57 46.64 46.70
Investments/assets 32.30 28.94 34.35 23.39 24.68 31.14
NSLR  inv/inv 4.79 3.28 14.68 3.27 7.20 5.35
CD  Ratio 55.28 63.70 53.81 60.20 73.61 57.15
ID  Ratio 39.35 34.28 40.28 27.23 38.99 37.94
Year  =  1995
Deposits/assets 81.74 81.87 83.94 85.42 81.33 82.06
Credit/assets 40.73 35.48 44.68 37.78 41.97 40.71
Investments/assets 34.39 36.66 32.66 35.38 33.80 34.38
NSLR  inv/inv 12.28 12.99 12.16 5.56 15.39 12.67
CD  Ratio 50.01 43.38 53.45 44.24 51.80 49.77
ID  Ratio 42.09 44.83 38.93 41.42 41.76 41.96
Year  =  1998
Deposits/assets 81.79 84.17 83.20 90.18 85.12 83.70
Credit/assets 41.33 37.35 35.25 40.44 40.90 39.40
Investments/assets 35.90 40.64 39.57 34.44 34.66 37.12
NSLR  inv/inv 15.79 27.29 17.86 13.30 20.11 19.68
CDRatio 50.80 44.41 42.38 44.84 48.30 47.26
ID  Ratio 43.78 48.26 47.62 38.19 40.70 44.34
Year  =  2000
Deposits/assets 79.29 83.34 85.66 83.07 86.05 84.36
Credit/assets 43.30 40.03 37.55 35.09 41.76 39.78
Investments/assets 36.29 39.00 44.71 41.87 35.72 39.40
NSLR  inv/inv 18.32 18.06 21.66 28.08 21.32 21.22
CD Ratio 54.63 48.24 44.05 42.23 48.56 47.30
ID  Ratio 45.75 47.03 52.22 50.38 41.58 46.79Economic and Political Weekly August 10, 2002 3363
the growth rate of IIP has fallen consid-
erably and remained always at a single
digit level. Of many factors that are likely
to have contributed in engendering this
sluggish industrial performance, liquidity
or credit crunch has been cited by many
experts as one of the major factors. Bhaumik
and Mukhopadhya (1997) have rightly
argued that observed trend in credit growth
and substitution of risky assets by sover-
eign debts in banks’ asset portfolio cannot
be considered as sufficient evidence of a
credit crunch leading to industrial reces-
sion. The main issue is whether credit
growth is explained more by supply side
factors or by demand side factors. In this
paper we follow a similar approach in
isolating the effect of demand side factors
from that of supply side factors in explaining
credit growth of Indian public sector banks
but at a more disaggregated level. Since
introduction of capital standards is expected
to affect supply side of credit flow, we
thereby expect to unravel the macroeconomic
impact of such policy prescriptions.
Before we examine this issue within the
framework of a suitably articulated model
of credit growth, we undertake a descrip-
tive analysis of the relationship between
asset portfolio changes and capital require-
ments at bank level.
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
Trends  in  Indian Trends  in  Indian Trends  in  Indian Trends  in  Indian Trends  in  Indian
Public Public Public Public Public Sector  Banks’ Sector  Banks’ Sector  Banks’ Sector  Banks’ Sector  Banks’
Asset  Portfolio  and  CRAR Asset  Portfolio  and  CRAR Asset  Portfolio  and  CRAR Asset  Portfolio  and  CRAR Asset  Portfolio  and  CRAR
The composition of 28 public sector
commercial bank portfolios has changed
significantly in the post reform period.
During the decade of 1980s, the C-D ratio
of these banks hovered around 60 per cent,
which came down to as low as 48.4 per cent
by March 1994. After registering a slight
increase in next two years, the ratio again
came down to 47.8 per cent by the end of
March 2000. On the other hand, invest-
ment-deposit ratio continued its upward
trend from 38 per cent in 1992 to around
47 per cent by end March 2000. The entire
banking sector also witnessed the same
trend in the last two decades (Graph 1).
Total securities holding of commercial
banks expanded rapidly through the 1980s
and began to speed up further after 1992
to facilitate the government of India bor-
rowing programmes. The rapid increase in
investment-deposit ratio since 1992 has
clearly coincided with a substantial de-
cline in credit-deposit ratio. Moreover, the
development of active securities and money
market and the access to deploy the funds
in commercial sectors through commer-
cial papers, stock markets, bonds/deben-
tures also enhanced banks’ investments
opportunities.
In order to examine the trends in chang-
ing composition of major balance sheet
items over different size class, the data
of 27 public sector banks have been di-
vided by asset size (end March 1992) as
follows: 1) less than Rs 10,000 crore;
2) Rs 10,000 crore to Rs 15,000 crore;
3) Rs 15,000 crore to Rs 20,000 crore;
4) Rs 20,000 crore to Rs 25,000 crore and
5) more than Rs 25,000 crore.
The trends in various balance sheet ratios,
classified by various size classes since
1992 are presented in Table 1. While deposit
share of public sector banks increased in
the post reform period, credit share (as a
ratio to total assets) declined from 47 per
cent in 1992 to 40 per cent in 2000. In
contrast, investments share (as a ratio to total
assets) increased form 31 per cent in 1992
to 39 per cent in 2000. The shift in portfolio
was more prominent for big size banks.
It is interesting to note that the change
in credit-deposit ratio during the post reform
period was more rapid for big size banks.
The medium size banks (size class 3 and
4) in the later period, especially after 1998,
noticeably increased their investment-
deposit ratio. Public sector banks also used
the other investments window, viz, to-
wards non-SLR securities more actively
during the post reform period. Thus, public
sector banks in the post reform period
adjusted their portfolio share in favour of
investments for the simple reason that
relative to bank credit, investments be-
came more profitable due to its less/no
capital standard requirement. These find-
ings, therefore, clearly underscore the need
to examine the impact of capital require-
ments on the shift in portfolio choice.
As in the case of various size classes,
public sector banks are classified by four
capital classes according to their CRAR
as follows: (i) less than 4 per cent; (ii) 4
per cent to 8 per cent (iii) 8 per cent to
12 per cent; and (iv) more than 12 per cent.
While the trends in CRAR, by different
size class, are presented in Table 2, the
distribution of banks by capital and size
class during 1996 to 2000 are presented
in Appendix.
On average, almost in every size class,
public sector banks augmented their capi-
tal during 1996 to 2000, although there
were a few noticeable exceptions. Around
two-thirds of public sector banks were
found to have CRAR in the range of 8 per
cent to 12 per cent. Most smaller public












































































Graph  1:  Ratios Graph  1:  Ratios Graph  1:  Ratios Graph  1:  Ratios Graph  1:  Ratios*  of  Resource  Mobilisation  of  Commercial  Banks   of  Resource  Mobilisation  of  Commercial  Banks   of  Resource  Mobilisation  of  Commercial  Banks   of  Resource  Mobilisation  of  Commercial  Banks   of  Resource  Mobilisation  of  Commercial  Banks
Table  2:  Trends  in  CRAR,  by  Size  Class  –  1996 Table  2:  Trends  in  CRAR,  by  Size  Class  –  1996 Table  2:  Trends  in  CRAR,  by  Size  Class  –  1996 Table  2:  Trends  in  CRAR,  by  Size  Class  –  1996 Table  2:  Trends  in  CRAR,  by  Size  Class  –  1996*  to  2000   to  2000   to  2000   to  2000   to  2000
Year Size  Class
1 2 3 4 5 Total
1996 7.91 10.06 2.37 6.07 9.97 7.57
1997 10.40 12.09 0.81 10.53 10.48 9.19
1998 12.11 12.37 8.15 9.34 10.76 11.13
1999 12.31 11.17 11.36 7.34 11.16 10.75
2000 12.41 11.64 11.63 3.42 10.81 10.54
Note: * The  data  on  CRAR  are  available  only  from  1996.
Note: * Compiled  from  various  issues  of  Reserve  Bank  of  India  Bulletin.  Investments  include  those  in
approved  securities  only.Economic and Political Weekly August 10, 2002 3364
contrast, a few medium-sized banks were
found to be severely undercapitalised.
Capital  and  Portfolio  Shifts Capital  and  Portfolio  Shifts Capital  and  Portfolio  Shifts Capital  and  Portfolio  Shifts Capital  and  Portfolio  Shifts
A bank may satisfy capital standards
requirement in three ways – through a shift
in portfolio, through shrinking total assets
or by raising new capital. The observed
change in ratio of capital to risk-weighted
assets will be a result of interplay of any
combination of these three factors. These
three factors are termed as portfolio shift,
total asset shift and capital shift. The
following simple identity brings out the
relationship between all the underlying
behavioural ratios.
Capital = (capital/risk-weighted assets) ×
(risk-weighted assets /total assets) ×  total
assets or, C=R ×  P ×  TA where R = the
risk-weighted capital ratio, P = the port-
folio factor and C = Capital.
For proportionate changes (e g, C = ∆ C),
C
 the relationship works out as follows:
C = R + P + TA or
R = C – P – TA
To meet a targeted risk-adjusted capi-
tal requirement, a bank has three options,
namely, (i) raise capital (increase C),
(ii) adjust the portfolio factor (lower P)
and (iii) shrink total assets (lower TA).
The adjustment behaviour of Indian
public sector banks consequent upon
introduction of capital adequacy norms
could be studied both at macro as well
as micro level. The macro-behaviour is
best studied in terms of selected ratios
like credit-deposit ratio, credit to com-
mercial sector to total deposit money
ratio, etc. These ratios are given in
Graph 2.
As mentioned earlier, it is observed that
there was a discernible shift towards in-
vestments, which comprise mostly gov-
ernment securities. The preference for zero
risk weighted assets on the part of com-
mercial banks is also reflected in the fact
that the banks are now holding a sizeable
amount of government papers, much more
than required statutorily. In order to study
the impact of capital standards on portfolio
behaviour at bank level, we first classify
the banks in terms of size and initial capital
to risk-weighted ratio on the same lines of
Haubrich and Wachtel (1993) study be-
cause it is hypothesised that banks with
lower CRAR ratio would be more prone
to adjust its portfolio to meet higher capital
standards. Because of data2 problems the
required decomposition analysis could be
undertaken only for two years,viz, for 1999
and 2000. These patterns are set out in
Tables 3A and 3B.
During 1999, banks did shift their port-
folio in a way that reduced their capital
requirements (Table 3A). This shift was
more pronounced for either under capit-
alised banks or over capitalised banks.
Banks likewise responded by raising capi-
tal by way of injecting fresh capital. Fi-
nally, on average, banks did not shrink,
and in fact grew over this period in every
size and capital class (except for an outlier
bank). During 2000, almost in each size
and capital category, banks adjusted their
portfolio to their capital burden (Table 3B).
Well-capitalised banks further raised their
capital and at the same time increased their
size also. These patterns roughly confirm
our emphasis on the portfolio effects on
the capital requirements.
To explore the relationship between
credit growth and capital requirements, we
classified public sector banks by size and
capital classes and presented in Table 4.
During 1996,undercapitalised banks recor-
ded a very low credit growth as compared
to well capitalised banks. Credit growth
of public sector banks worsen further in
1997. Alongwith undercapitalised banks,
majority of well capitalised banks also
recorded a very low credit off-take. Except
for four banks, all other public sector banks,
irrespective of their size, registered the
minimum 8 per cent capital requirement
during 1997. It may be mentioned that the
year 1997 is marked with noticeable in-
dustrial slowdown. From 1998 onwards,
the pattern of credit growth is much more
systematic: while undercapitalised banks
were more risk averse and recorded lower
credit growth, bank credit of well capit-
alised banks continued to grow by a healthy
rate, irrespective of their size. However,
in general, credit portfolio of small banks
Graph  2:  Selected  Ratios  (in  per  cent)  of  Public  Sector  Banks Graph  2:  Selected  Ratios  (in  per  cent)  of  Public  Sector  Banks Graph  2:  Selected  Ratios  (in  per  cent)  of  Public  Sector  Banks Graph  2:  Selected  Ratios  (in  per  cent)  of  Public  Sector  Banks Graph  2:  Selected  Ratios  (in  per  cent)  of  Public  Sector  Banks
Table  3A:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements:  Portfolio  Shifts, Table  3A:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements:  Portfolio  Shifts, Table  3A:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements:  Portfolio  Shifts, Table  3A:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements:  Portfolio  Shifts, Table  3A:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements:  Portfolio  Shifts,
Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  1999 Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  1999 Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  1999 Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  1999 Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  1999
Capital  Class Size  Class
12 3 4 5
Portfolio  shift  P
1- -- -- - -0.13 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.11 -0.04
4 0.05 -0.02 -0.03 - - -0.02
Size  shift  TA
1- -- -- - 0.10 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 0.17 0.20 0.17 0.13 0.16
4 0.22 0.22 0.27 - - 0.19
Capital  shift  C
1- -- -- - -7.09 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 0.05 0.11 0.21 0.27 0.25
4 0.30 0.12 0.14 - - 0.13
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grew much faster than big banks and
undercapitalised banks were marked with
very low credit growth during 1996 to
2000.
I V I V I V I V I V
Capital  Standard  Norms  and Capital  Standard  Norms  and Capital  Standard  Norms  and Capital  Standard  Norms  and Capital  Standard  Norms  and
Banks’  Lending  Behaviour Banks’  Lending  Behaviour Banks’  Lending  Behaviour Banks’  Lending  Behaviour Banks’  Lending  Behaviour
An  Econometric  Analysis An  Econometric  Analysis An  Econometric  Analysis An  Econometric  Analysis An  Econometric  Analysis
The decomposition analysis of banks’
balance sheet aggregates given in the earlier
section is mainly indicative in nature. It
does not explain the causative factors that
are responsible for the observed trend in
banks’ lending to business sectors. For
this, we need to formulate a well-articu-
lated behavioural model of banks’ lend-
ing. For the sake of brevity we will try to
capture only the most important factors
along with the capital to risk-weighted
asset ratio, which is expected to capture
the regulatory pressure on banks’ lending
behaviour.
The observed lending of a bank to
commercial sector is postulated to be the
result of interplay of two sets of factors,
namely, demand factors as well as supply
factors. Adopting a disequilibrium frame-
work, the observed credit flow can be
modelled in the following way:
  Co = Min.(Cd, Cs)
where superscripts o, d and s stand for
observed off take of, demand of and poten-
tial supply of credit, respectively. The
demand schedule and supply schedule of
credit would be modelled as Cd = f (D)
and Cs= f (S) where D and S respectively
represent an array of demand side vari-
ables and supply side variables.
Specification  of Specification  of Specification  of Specification  of Specification  of
Demand  Schedule Demand  Schedule Demand  Schedule Demand  Schedule Demand  Schedule
 The demand of credit by the commer-
cial sector (i e, the credit demanding sec-
tor) is postulated to depend on level of
economic activity of the commercial sec-
tor, cost of credit, health of the balance
sheet of the commercial sector and avail-
ability of alternative source of fund, prob-
ably at a cheaper rate, for the commercial
sector. Let us elaborate more on these
variables and specify the actual data ele-
ments used in this study to represent these
demand variables.
That level of bank credit demanded by
an economic agent will be largely deter-
mined, in a ceteris paribus way, by the level
of economic activity, however measured,
undertaken by the agent requires no further
explanation. The main issue is that of
measurement of that level relevant for
individual banks, as we are interested in
carrying out our analysis at bank level.
First of all, we should note that an aggre-
gate measure of economic activity like
GDP or Index of Industrial Production
(IIP) may be inadequate, mainly for two
reasons. Firstly, for a cross-sectional analy-
sis, this variable would provide no addi-
tional information and would be absorbed
in the intercept term. Even for a panel data
analysis covering a short time duration
such a macro-indicator would hardly have
any impact on analysis. More importantly,
even for a given macro-environment each
bank would face a different set of clientele
depending on its regional spread, its his-
torical client profile, etc. Based on this
consideration, we have constructed a syn-
thetic IIP (SYNIIP) for each bank, taking
industrial composition of its own loan
portfolio, as available from BSR returns
and production index of the respective
sectors3 from the sectorwise IIP.
As a measure of cost of credit, we have
calculated the realised rates of return on
bank advances. As a measure of availabil-
ity of alternative source of fund to the
borrowers, we use a proxy in the absence
of any direct data. We consider the growth
in non-SLR investment in the banks’ asset
portfolio as an indirect indicator of sub-
stitution of traditional bank credit by other
sources  of fund on the part of commercial
borrowers. It may be noted here that non-
SLR investments that is of direct relevance
to our problem is banks’ investment in
commercial paper issued by corporate
entities. As investment in commercial paper
of corporate entities is carved out of total
credit limit available to the entity from the
banking sector, it is presumed that growth
in non-SLR investment may be considered
as a good proxy measure for the growth
in availability of alternative fund to
borrowers. As regards the health of the
balance sheet of commercial sector, we
have taken the ratio of NPA to total ad-
vances as an indirect measure of the health
of balance sheet of borrowers of bank loan.
Obviously, by using this indirect measure,
we are ignoring the problem of wilful
default. For, willful default may not nec-
essarily result from balance sheet weak-
ness of loans of bank fund.
Specification  of Specification  of Specification  of Specification  of Specification  of
Supply Supply Supply Supply Supply Schedule Schedule Schedule Schedule Schedule
The supply schedule of credit is postu-
lated to depend on supply of fund to the
banking sector in the form of deposit,
capital to risk-weighted asset ratio (CRAR),
excess of return on advances over that on
investment and intermediation spread. A
discussion on each of the chosen variable
follows.
In India aggregate deposits form the
largest amount (around 90 per cent) of
funds mobilised by commercial banks.
Therefore, deposit growth essentially forms
the binding constraint on a bank's ability
to extend loans to its borrowers. For public
sector banks at least, the growth of de-
posits is largely exogenously determined
and the banks have to find a profitable
avenue for the deployment of fund so
obtained.
The CRAR is the variable of interest to
us in this exercise and is expected to reflect
the impact of regulatory norms (pressure)
on a bank's lending behaviour.
As there are two major avenues for fund
deployment, namely loans and investments,
it is expected that excess of returns on
loans over investments would affect the
supply side of loans made available by
banks to its industrial borrowers. Accord-
Table  3B:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements: Table  3B:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements: Table  3B:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements: Table  3B:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements: Table  3B:  Adjustments  to  Risk-based  Capital  Requirements:
Portfolio  Shifts, Portfolio  Shifts, Portfolio  Shifts, Portfolio  Shifts, Portfolio  Shifts,Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  2000 Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  2000 Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  2000 Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  2000 Growth  and  Raising  Capital  as  on  March  2000
Capital  Class Size  Class
12 3 4 5
Portfolio  shift  P
1- -- -- - 0.03 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 -0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.05
4 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.04
Size  shift  TA
1- -- -- - 0.10 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 0.24 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.15
4 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.31 0.12
Capital  shift  C
1- -- -- - 0.46 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.08 0.19
4 0.18 0.18 0.29 0.17 0.06
∧
∧
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ingly we have included this variable as one
of the explanatory variable in the supply
schedule of bank loans. Finally, interme-
diation spread reflects the overall margin
received by banks in their deployment of
fund and increasing margin should have
a positive effect on the supply of bank
funds to the borrowers. This variable has,
therefore, been considered as an additional
determinant of supply of bank fund. Sum-
mary statistics of the variables are pre-
sented in Table 5.
It is observed that the growth in synthetic
IIP (SYNIIP) is higher than that of IIP
general for most of the years. Thus the
demand for bank credit seems to be grow-
ing at a higher rate than the overall demand
of the organised sectors of the economy.
Over 15 per cent of the gross advances of
public sector banks turned out to be non-
performing. While deposit growth has been
steady in the post reform period, credit
growth has been fluctuating. Banks’ in-
vestments in commercial papers, bonds/
debentures/shares of public sector under-
takings and private corporate sector, as
represented by non-SLR investments, have
shown accelerated growth during the post
reform period. The excess return of ad-
vances over investments has been declin-
ing and thus underscoring the importance
of alternative avenues of deployment of
funds over conventional bank credit. In-
deed, during 2000, average return on
investments was higher than that on ad-
vances. In the face of increased compe-
tition from domestic and foreign banks,
intermediation spread has also been de-
clining since liberalisation.
Estimation  Strategy Estimation  Strategy Estimation  Strategy Estimation  Strategy Estimation  Strategy
We have already noted that observed
credit growth for any bank is jointly de-
termined by the demand and supply for
credit function. We make the first assump-
tion that the same demand and supply
function are applicable to all public sector
banks, not an unrealistic assumption given
the similarity of ownership structure and
regulatory environment for these banks. If
it was a priori known whether a particular
observation on credit growth belonged to
a demand constrained regime or a supply
constrained regime then it would be a
simple exercise to estimate the relevant
coefficients of respective functions. In the
absence of such prior knowledge, we adopt
the method of switching regression to
estimate the coefficients of the two tar-
geted functions. The methodology is briefly
explained below.
Let y be the dependent variable, which
is credit growth in our case.
Let ith obervation on y be determined
one of the following two regimes
    k
yi =Σ ß1jXji +uli =x 'iß1 +u1i ...(1)
j=1
k
yi = Σ  ß2jXji +u 2i =x 'iß2 +u2i ...(2)
j=1
where x's denote the explanatory vari-
ables. The errors, u1i and u2i, are assumed
to be normally and independently distrib-
uted with zero mean and constant vari-
ance. The variance for the first regime is
σ 1
2 and for the second regime σ 2
2. The
problem is to estimate ß1, ß2, σ 1, and σ 2
without knowing a priori which observa-
tions belong to which regime.
We can solve this problem using Goldfeld
and Quandt's D-method for switching
regression and estimate the parameters
efficiently using maximum likelihood
method. Assuming that there exists obser-
vations on some exogenous variable z such
that z determines whether ith observation
is generated from one equation or the other
we may write
   k
yi = Σ ß1jXji +u1i =x'iß1 +u1i if pz ≤  0 ...(3)
j=1
k
yi = Σ  ß2jXji +u2i =x'iß2 +u2i if pz > 0 ...(4)
j=1
where, p is an unknown coefficient to be
estimated.
Replacing the unit step function on z
with a continuous approximation using the
cumulative normal integral, we can have
a more practical method that produces
consistent estimates of various parameters
of interest. For z we consider the synthetic
variable defined by excess or shortfall of
reserve money growth over aggregate bank
credit growth. The underlying logic is as
follows. If reserve money grows faster
than the bank credit growth, it is more
Table  4:  Credit  Growth,  by  Size  and  Capital  Class Table  4:  Credit  Growth,  by  Size  and  Capital  Class Table  4:  Credit  Growth,  by  Size  and  Capital  Class Table  4:  Credit  Growth,  by  Size  and  Capital  Class Table  4:  Credit  Growth,  by  Size  and  Capital  Class
(1996  to  2000)
Capital  Class Size  Class
12 3 45
Year:1996
1 9.06 1.29 -0.01 14.00 - -
2 7.08 - - 7.70 - -- -
3 15.91 14.89 22.10 21.77 17.56
4 18.27 32.39 - -- -- -
Year:1997
1- -- -- - -7.27 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 12.52 4.36 2.36 5.61 8.11
4 15.77 4.59 - -- - 4.02
Year:1998
1- -- - 5.76 - -- -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 17.17 17.40 16.62 19.48 16.89
4 11.03 36.02 - -- - 19.54
Year:1999
1- -- -- - 3.25 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 13.45 20.09 18.03 20.48 15.04
4 12.46 22.76 21.99 - - 8.72
Year:2000
1- -- -- - 9.43 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 25.53 20.44 18.29 22.63 20.01
4 17.61 17.28 23.46 20.99 15.65
Table  5:  Summary  Statistics:  Mean  Values  of  the  Variables Table  5:  Summary  Statistics:  Mean  Values  of  the  Variables Table  5:  Summary  Statistics:  Mean  Values  of  the  Variables Table  5:  Summary  Statistics:  Mean  Values  of  the  Variables Table  5:  Summary  Statistics:  Mean  Values  of  the  Variables
Variables 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Credit  Growth  (CRGR) 14.68 8.26 17.64 17.13 19.69
Growth  in  Synthetic  IIP  (SYNIIP) 12.74 10.86 12.09 14.54 10.26
Growth  in  Non-SLR  investments 16.83 63.10 50.85 42.31 17.67
Gross  NPA  as  per  cent  to  gross  advances  (NPA) 18.12 18.53 17.05 16.35 14.22
Return  on  advances  (RoAD) 12.65 13.87 11.85 11.45 10.95
Deposit  Growth  (DEGR) 12.27 15.44 18.22 18.99 17.19
CRAR 7.57 9.19 11.13 10.75 10.54
Return  on  advances  –  Return  on  investments
(RoAD-RoI) 1.69 3.26 0.76 0.62 -0.03
Intermediation  Spread 3.09 3.17 3.03 2.87 2.79
IIP  General 13.04 6.09 6.51 3.81 8.17Economic and Political Weekly August 10, 2002 3367
likely that a situation of easy liquidity
prevails in the market and demand con-
straint is likely to be the binding constraint
on an individual bank’s credit growth and
supply constraint is likely to be the binding
one in the opposite case.
Empirical  Evidence Empirical  Evidence Empirical  Evidence Empirical  Evidence Empirical  Evidence
Based on the above estimation proce-
dure we have estimated our credit demand
and supply schedules using the data de-
scribed earlier in the paper. The results of
our estimation are given in Table 6. For
a comparative study and to examine the
robustness of the parameter estimate we
have reported OLS regression estimate
(separately for demand and supply equa-
tion) along with switching regression re-
sults. It is observed that adjusted R2
improves significantly when one uses
switching regression model as compared
with traditional OLS regression. The re-
sults are also quite different. One reason
for this could be the problem of misspeci-
fication in OLS regression model. Thus
parameter estimates under OLS regression
may be biased and one should not make
valid conclusions over demand/supply of
bank credit based on OLS estimates.
It can be seen from the demand equation
under switching regression model that the
factors which affected the credit demand
during 1996-2000 are ‘growth in non-SLR
investments’ and average return on ad-
vances. On the other hand, the growth in
overall economy, particularly in industrial
segment of it, as represented by the syn-
thetic IIP, has positive but insignificant
impact on the demand of bank credit. The
quality of borrowers, as measured by the
proxy indicator NPA, does have a negative
impact on the demand of bank credit. But
the quality of borrowers did not influence
credit growth significantly.
Financial sector reforms, initiated dur-
ing 1991-92, have enhanced commercial
banks' opportunity in extending credit
facilities to commercial sector by way of
non-SLR investments. Bank credit chan-
nel ceases to be the only window in ex-
tending financing facilities to commercial
sector. In the overall risk-return trade off,
public sector banks have shown acceler-
ated growth in non-SLR investments in the
recent past and more than 10 per cent of
their depository resources are diverted
towards non-SLR investments. As a result,
the demand for bank credit has been sig-
nificantly affected by the growth in alter-
native investments opportunities. On the
other scenario, cost of fund as represented
by return on advances, continued to be
another dominant factor determining credit
demand in India.
From the supply equation, it is clear that
both CRAR and intermediation spread have
significant impact on the supply of bank
credit in India. While CRAR has a nega-
tive effect on credit supply, higher inter-
mediation spread leads to higher supply of
bank credit. The regulatory pressure, i e,
the expected/potential penalty implied by
a breach of the capital requirement, has a
significant impact on bank lending in India.
Adoption of stricter risk management
practice by the commercial banks in the
wake of deregulation of lending norms in
any respect by the regulators and its inter-
play with minimum capital requirements
(regulatory pressure) have had a dampening
effect on the credit supply. Thus, in Indian
scenario, capital requirements enforced a
risk-averse mind-set on the overall risk-
taking appetite of the banks. On the other
Table  6:  Non-Linear  Regression  Estimates  of  the  Parameters Table  6:  Non-Linear  Regression  Estimates  of  the  Parameters Table  6:  Non-Linear  Regression  Estimates  of  the  Parameters Table  6:  Non-Linear  Regression  Estimates  of  the  Parameters Table  6:  Non-Linear  Regression  Estimates  of  the  Parameters
(Dependent  variable:  Credit  growth)
Estimate SE Adj  R2
OLS  regression
i) Demand  equation
Growth  in  synthetic  IIP -0.042 0.037 0.469
Growth  in  non-SLR  investments 0.018 0.013
N P A -0.719* 0.082
RoAd -2.682* 0.403
ii) Supply  equation
Deposit  growth 0.641* 0.085 0.573
CRAR 0.013 0.156
RoAd-RoI -2.744* 0.337
Intermediation  spread 3.082* 0.960
Switching  regression
i) Demand  equation
Growth  in  synthetic  IIP 0.032 0.033 0.904
Growth  in  non-SLR  investments -0.041* 0.012
N P A -0.107 0.106
RoAd -2.052* 0.726
ii) Supply  equation
Deposit  growth 0.114 0.084
CRAR -0.452* 0.175
RoAd-RoI -0.583 0.470
Intermediation  spread 2.895* 1.341
P 0.015* 0.006
*:  Significant  at  5  per  cent  level.
Table  7:  Classification  of  Residual  (Predicted-Actual) Table  7:  Classification  of  Residual  (Predicted-Actual) Table  7:  Classification  of  Residual  (Predicted-Actual) Table  7:  Classification  of  Residual  (Predicted-Actual) Table  7:  Classification  of  Residual  (Predicted-Actual)
Credit  Credit  Credit  Credit  Credit  Growth,  by  Capital  and  Size  Class Growth,  by  Capital  and  Size  Class Growth,  by  Capital  and  Size  Class Growth,  by  Capital  and  Size  Class Growth,  by  Capital  and  Size  Class
Capital  Class Size  Class
12 3 4 5
Year=1996
1 -3.32 -4.05 -3.86 -4.02 - -
2 -2.68 - - -3.17 - -- -
3 -4.23 -5.71 -2.37 -3.67 -4.60
4 -5.18 -5.41 - -- -- -
Year=1997
1- -- -- - 5.61 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 2.28 0.27 4.83 4.12 2.99
4 1.80 2.51 - -- - 5.59
Year=1998
1- -- - 1.23 - -- -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 -0.39 1.11 1.43 1.69 1.16
4 1.31 0.08 - -- - 1.43
Year=1999
1- -- -- - -2.13 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 -1.57 -0.81 -0.46 -0.43 0.09
4 -0.20 -0.58 -1.05 - - 0.78
Year=2000
1- -- -- - 3.34 - -
2- -- -- -- -- -
3 -0.30 0.53 0.50 0.72 0.83
4 1.40 1.61 1.08 1.51 1.05Economic and Political Weekly August 10, 2002 3368
hand, the impact of deposit growth and the
excess return in advances over investments
were found to be insignificant.
The residual (predicted-actual) credit
growth based on the switching regression
model, by various capital and size classes,
is presented in Table 7. A negative value
of the residual means actual credit growth
is higher than the predicted one. By this
classification, it is interesting to see that
there are two distinct phases of lending
behaviour during 1996 to 2000. While
actual credit growth was higher for 1996
and 1999, predicted credit growth was
much higher in 1997, 1998 and 2000.
Since most of the public sector banks have
shifted to higher CRAR class in the later
years, the excess/shortfall in credit growth
based on our model is a clear pointer to
the possibility of regulatory pressures acting
as a controlling factor in supply of credit
to the commercial sector.
V V V V V
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
In this paper, we have tried to assess the
impact of imposition of uniform capital
requirement norm on flow of credit to the
business sector by the most important
segment of the Indian banking sector, i e,
Indian public sector banks. A simple
decomposition analysis of growth in assets
portfolio as well as a model based analysis
of credit growth for the Indian public sector
banks have enabled us to conclude the
following:
(1) In the post reform period, public sector
banks did shift their portfolio in a way that
reduce their capital requirements. This was
more pronounced for either under-
capitalised or overcapitalised banks.
(2) Adoption of stricter risk management
practice in respect of bank lending in the
post reform period and its interplay with
minimum capital requirements (regulatory
pressure) have had a dampening effect on
the overall credit supply.
Notes Notes Notes Notes Notes
[The views expressed in the paper are those of
the authors’ only.]
1 The minimum capital ratio has since been raised
to 9 per cent, effective from end-March 2000.
2 The data used in this study are taken from
various issues of Statistical Tables Relating to
Banks in India and Report on Trend and Progress
of Banking in India, Reserve Bank of India.
3 Sectors included in computation of Synthetic
IIP are: (1) mining and quarrying, (2) food
products, (3) beverages, tobacco and related
products, (4) cotton textiles, (5) wool, silk and
man-made fibre textiles, (6) jute and other
vegetable fibre textiles (except cotton), (7) textile
products (including wearing apparel), (8) wood
and wood products, furnitures and fixtures,
(9) paper and paper products and printing,
publishing and allied industries, (10) leather
and leather and fur products, (11) basic
chemicals and chemical products, (12) rubber,
plastic, petroleum and coal products, (13) non-
metalic mineral products, (14) basic metal and
alloy industries, (15) metal products and parts
(except machinery and equipment), (16) machi-
nery and equipment other than transport
equipment, (17) transport equipments and parts,
(18) other manufacturing industries, and
(19) electricity.
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Appendix:  Distribution  of  Banks  by  Capital  and  Size  Class:  1996  to  2000 Appendix:  Distribution  of  Banks  by  Capital  and  Size  Class:  1996  to  2000 Appendix:  Distribution  of  Banks  by  Capital  and  Size  Class:  1996  to  2000 Appendix:  Distribution  of  Banks  by  Capital  and  Size  Class:  1996  to  2000 Appendix:  Distribution  of  Banks  by  Capital  and  Size  Class:  1996  to  2000
Capital  Class Size  Class
1 2 3 4 5 Total
Year  =  1996
12 1 1 1 - -5
21 - -2 - -- -3
3 9 1 115 1 7
41 1 - -- -- -2
Total 13 3 4 2 5 27
Year  =  1997
1- -- -2 - -- -2
2- -- -- -- -- -- -
3 1 12 215 2 1
42 1 - -- -1 4
Total 13 3 4 1 6 27
                    Year  =  1998
1- -- -1 - -- -1
2- -- -- -- -- -- -
3 6 4 315 1 9
43 2 - -- -2 7
Total 9 6 4 1 7 27
Year  =  1999
1- -- -- -1- -1
2- -- -- -- -- -- -
3 1 7 235 1 8
42 3 1 - -2 8
Total 3 10 3 4 7 27
Year  =  2000
1- -- -- -1- -1
2- -- -- -- -- -- -
3 2 3 518 1 9
4 1 2 211 7
Total 3 5 7 3 9 27
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